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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 The district court sanctioned appellants for violating 
a preliminary injunction.  Appellants dispute both the finding of 
contempt and the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed.  We 
agree with the district court that appellants failed to comply 
with the preliminary injunction, but we find that one of the 
sanctions the district court imposed is inappropriate.  We thus 
will affirm in part and reverse in part.    
 
I. 
 In 1983, Robin F. Woods ("Mrs. Woods") founded Robin 
Woods, Inc. ("RWI"), a doll manufacturer.  RWI's dolls were 
popular and rapid growth ensued.  Mrs. Woods obtained capital to 
finance RWI's expansion by selling most of her holdings in RWI to 
investors, among which was the Pittsburgh Seed Fund ("the Seed 
Fund").  The Seed Fund required Mrs. Woods to enter into a 
written employment agreement and a non-competition/non-disclosure 
agreement with RWI, as well as to assign her copyrights to RWI.  
 Even though RWI's sales continued to increase 
throughout the 1980s, the company never turned a profit.  Unhappy 
with RWI's financial performance, the Seed Fund in 1990 
instructed its representatives on RWI's board to remove Mrs. 
Woods from her management role but to continue to employ her as a 
doll designer.  Following Mrs. Woods' demotion, RWI's product 
line was also altered and new distribution channels were created. 
The Seed Fund's changes proved catastrophic, leading RWI to the 
verge of bankruptcy.  Mrs. Woods offered to return as CEO to try 
to save RWI, but the Seed Fund rebuffed her.  Mrs. Woods resigned 
from RWI on December 6, 1991, to go to work for one of RWI's 
competitors, the Alexander Doll Company ("Alexander"). 
 RWI filed suit against Mrs. Woods and Alexander on 
December 24, 1991, alleging Lanham Act violations, injury to 
business reputation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
duty, tortious interference, breach of employment contract, and 
unfair competition.  RWI also sought a preliminary injunction to 
bar Mrs. Woods from employment with Alexander or from using the 
name "Robin Woods" in connection with the design, manufacture, 
and sale of dolls.   
 After hearing four days of testimony, a magistrate 
recommended that Mrs. Woods be enjoined from involvement in the 
collectible doll industry.  The district court's preliminary 
injunction expanded the magistrate's restrictions on Mrs. Woods 
by limiting use of her name: 
1.  Defendants [Mrs. Woods and Alexander]     
. . . are enjoined from characterizing, 
promoting or advertising either orally or in 
writing, that any dolls manufactured by 
Alexander Doll Company for which Robin F. 
Woods provides any services  
. . .  
(g) are signed or otherwise 
identified with Robin F. Woods. 
. . .  
5.  Defendants . . . are enjoined from 
designating or identifying any specific dolls 
manufactured by any company, including but 
not limited to Alexander Doll Company, for 
which Robin F. Woods provided services. 
. . .  
8.  Defendants . . . are enjoined from 
identifying Robin F. Woods as having provided 
any services for any dolls manufactured by 
any company, including but not limited to the 
Alexander Doll Company, such as on the 
product, product tag, box, or in connection 
with any advertising or promotion of the 
dolls. 
    
 Mrs. Woods consulted counsel to determine what work she 
could do at Alexander and still comply with the preliminary 
injunction.  Counsel told her that she could design play dolls 
(but not collectible dolls) if she used a nom de plume (but not 
her name).  Mrs. Woods took the name Alice Darling and began to 
create a new line of play dolls for Alexander called "Let's Play 
Dolls."   
 An announcement of Mrs. Woods' new role was prepared 
for distribution in doll industry magazines, letters to 
retailers, and trade show posters.  The announcement stated: 
ALEXANDER DOLL COMPANY  
is pleased to announce that 
MRS. ROBIN F. WOODS* 
[Photograph] 
is exclusively associated with the 
LET'S PLAY DOLLS 
division of the Alexander Doll Company 
and will be creating dolls 
for play under the name 
ALICE DARLING 
 
*Mrs. Woods was formerly associated with 
Robin Woods, Inc. (RWI).  Mrs. Woods resigned 
from RWI in December 1991.  A federal court, 
on February 7, 1992, preliminarily ruled that 
RWI owns the trade name "Robin Woods" and 
that Mrs. Woods may not use her name to 
identify any dolls which she designs. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Woods has assumed a new 
trade name "Alice Darling" to identify the 




 RWI filed a motion for contempt sanctions, arguing that 
the preliminary injunction forbade Mrs. Woods' involvement with 
Alexander and Let's Play Dolls.  After discovery and a four-day 
hearing, the district court rejected most of RWI's contentions, 
finding only one violation of the preliminary injunction: 
dissemination of the Alice Darling announcement.  The district 
court awarded RWI $107,000 in damages, which reflected the time 
and expense RWI's management incurred preparing for the contempt 
proceeding.  Attorneys' fees of $68,707.52 were also awarded. 
Mrs. Woods and Alexander now appeal.     
 The district court had jurisdiction over RWI's claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United 
States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 
1269, 1272 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
II. 
 The district court found that Mrs. Woods and Alexander 
did not respect the injunction in three ways.  First, 
"[d]efendants promoted and advertised that dolls manufactured by 
Alexander were designed by Mrs. Woods by identifying 'Alice 
Darling' as Mrs. Woods and as the designer of 'Let's Play 
Dolls.'"  Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods, 815 F. Supp. 856, 868 (W.D. 
Pa. 1992).  This, the district court said, violated paragraph one 
of the injunction which forbids "promoting or advertising . . . 
dolls manufactured by Alexander . . . which . . . are . . . 
identified with Robin F. Woods."  Second, "[d]efendants, by their 
promotional campaign, designated or identified specific dolls 
manufactured by Alexander for which Mrs. Woods provided 
services."  Id.  This, the district court said, violated 
paragraph five of the injunction which forbids "designating or 
identifying any specific dolls . . . for which Robin F. Woods 
provided services."  Third, "[d]efendants identified Mrs. Woods 
as having provided services for the dolls of the 'Let's Play 
Dolls' line . . . in . . . promotion of the doll."  Id.  This, 
the district court said, violated paragraph eight of the 
injunction which forbids defendants from "identifying Robin F. 
Woods as having provided any services for any dolls manufactured 
by . . . Alexander . . . in connection with . . . promotion of 
the doll."  Id. 
 Mrs. Woods and Alexander attack the district court's 
ruling, noting that civil contempt must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence; where there is ground to doubt the 
wrongfulness of the conduct, they insist, there is no contempt. 
They further claim that they acted in good faith, with the advice 
of counsel, and without an intent to arrogate RWI's goodwill. 
Finally, they contend that their use of "Robin Woods" was 
arguably outside the scope of a vague injunction and consistent 
with the purpose of the injunction and that this substantial 
compliance with the injunction renders the finding of contempt 
inappropriate.  We find these arguments unpersuasive.   
 Contempt, as Mrs. Woods and Alexander correctly note, 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence: 
The plaintiff has a heavy burden to show a 
defendant guilty of civil contempt.  It must 
be done by "clear and convincing evidence," 
and where there is ground to doubt the 
wrongfulness of the conduct, he should not be 
adjudged in contempt. 
 
Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 
1982) (quoting Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 
1938)).  In this case, however, there is no ground to doubt the 
wrongfulness of the conduct -- the injunction forbade 
identification of Mrs. Woods with Alexander's dolls in 
promotional materials and the Alice Darling announcement made 
such an identification. 
 Contrary to Mrs. Woods' and Alexander's assertions, 
good faith is not a defense to civil contempt.  We recently held 
in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148-49 (3d Cir. 
1994), that "willfulness is not a necessary element of civil 
contempt," and, accordingly, that "evidence . . . regarding . . . 
good faith does not bar the conclusion . . . that [the defendant] 
acted in contempt."    
 Contemnors, as Mrs. Woods and Alexander correctly note, 
are sometimes excused when they violate vague court orders: there 
is a "longstanding salutary rule in contempt cases that 
ambiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the 
person charged with the contempt."  Eavenson, Auchmuty & 
Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1985).  This 
well established principle does not aid the appellants here, 
however.  While we too perceive some vagueness in paragraph 5 of 
the injunction, the prohibitions that paragraphs 1 and 8 were 
intended to impose seem crystal clear to us.  As paragraph 8 puts 
it:  "Defendants . . . are enjoined from identifying Robin F. 
Woods as having provided any services for any dolls manufactured 
by . . . Alexander Doll Company . . . in connection with any  
. . . promotion of the dolls." 
 Some courts, as Mrs. Woods and Alexander correctly 
note, have recognized a substantial compliance defense to 
contempt citations: 
[S]ubstantial compliance with a court order 
is a defense to an action for civil contempt. 
. . . If a violating party has taken 'all 
reasonable steps' to comply with the court 
order, technical or inadvertent violations of 
the order will not support a finding of civil 
contempt. 
 
General Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th 
Cir. 1986).  Even if this court were to recognize substantial 
compliance as a defense to contempt, however, it would not apply 
to Mrs. Woods and Alexander.  Although Mrs. Woods and Alexander 
acted in good faith and on the advice of counsel, see Robin 
Woods, Inc. 815 F. Supp. at 875, their violation was not 
technical or inadvertent -- they consciously chose to associate 
Mrs. Woods with dolls that Alexander would manufacture.  The 
district court's contempt citation thus must stand.         
 
III. 
 Mrs. Woods and Alexander dispute the sanctions that the 
district court imposed on them, maintaining that it was an abuse 
of discretion to award RWI $68,505.72 in attorneys' fees and 
$107,000 in damages for the time and expense that RWI's 
management incurred in preparing for the contempt proceeding. 
"The standard of our review of a district court sanction for 
civil contempt is whether the district court abused its wide 
discretion in fashioning a remedy."  Delaware Valley Citizens' 
Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).   
 
A. 
 RWI sought attorneys' fees of $104,062.53 plus an 
expert witness fee of $11,976.00.  The district court awarded 
only $68,707.52, because "plaintiff was largely unsuccessful on 
its motion for contempt, sanctions, and attorneys' fees."  Mrs. 
Woods and Alexander maintain that attorneys' fees cannot be 
awarded to RWI because their conduct, even if contumacious, was 
not willful -- they acted in good faith on the advice of counsel 
without intent to harm RWI.   
 Sanctions for civil contempt serve two purposes:  "to 
coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order and 
to compensate for losses sustained by the disobedience." 
McDonald's Corp. v. Victory Investments, 727 F.2d 82, 87 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Compensatory awards seek to ensure that the innocent 
party receives the benefit of the injunction: 
the Court will be guided by the principle 
that sanctions imposed after a finding of 
civil contempt to remedy past noncompliance 
with a decree are not to vindicate the 
court's authority but to make reparation to 
the injured party and restore the parties to 
the position they would have held had the 
injunction been obeyed. 
 
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. Freund, 509 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).   
 Based on this understanding of the functions served by 
sanctions for civil contempt, we reject the notion that a finding 
of willfulness is a prerequisite to an award of attorneys' fees 
against the violator of an injunction.  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit explained in Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 
559 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1977):   
It matters not whether the disobedience is 
willful[;] the cost of bringing the violation 
to the attention of the court is part of the 
damages suffered by the prevailing party and 
those costs would reduce any benefits gained 
by the prevailing party from the court's 
violated order.  Because damages assessed in 
civil contempt cases are oftentimes 
compensatory (instead of coercive) the mental 
state of the violator should not determine 
the level of compensation due. 
 Only with an award of attorneys' fees can RWI be 
restored to the position it would have occupied had Mrs. Woods 
and Alexander complied with the district court's injunction. 
Accordingly, accepting both the district court's findings 
regarding good faith and advice of counsel and the appellants' 
assertion that they intended no harm to RWI, we find no basis for 
disturbing the award of attorneys' fees. 
 
B.   
 The district court ordered Mrs. Woods and Alexander to 
pay RWI $107,000 as compensation for "management's time and 
expense in preparing for the contempt litigation."  Robin Woods, 
Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 875.  The court explained its decision in 
this way:  "A successful party proving contempt is entitled to 
recover, by way of civil fine, the expense of investigating the 
violation of the order [and] preparing for and conducting the 
contempt proceeding, in addition to attorneys' fees."  Id.   
 The $107,000 figure was based solely on the following 
testimony from RWI executive David Lamont: 
 Q.  You said you spent some management 
time preparing for this hearing . . . . . 
Before coming here did you examin[e] the 
company's books and records to determine how 
much time was expended in preparing for this 
hearing today for the sanctions? 
 A.  Yes, I did. 
. . .  
 Q.  Let's go to how much time.  You said 
you studied the time and you are familiar 
with the cost of your time.  Is that correct? 
 A.  Sure. . . . I look at my payroll 
records, sure. 
 Q.  You are the chief financial officer 
of the company.  Is that correct? 
 A.  Yes. 
 Q.  Now, can you tell this court how 
much money was expended by the Robin Woods 
Company on management time, in-house 
management time, in preparing for the 
sanctions hearing today? 
 . . .  
 A.  Through the spring and summer, I 
kept track of the rough proportions of time 
that each of my key people were spending 
preparing for this case.  I tracked it on a 
month-by-month basis, and through October it 
adds up to about $107,000. 
 
 Just as attorneys' fee awards are "remedial and 
designed to compensate complainants for losses incurred as a 
result of the contemnors' violations," Roe v. Operation Rescue, 
919 F.2d 857, 869 (3d Cir. 1990), so too are awards to cover the 
other expenses involved in demonstrating violations.  NLRB v. 
Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO, 430 F.2d 
1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). 
Thus, there can be no doubt that the district court had the 
authority to order Mrs. Woods and Alexander to compensate RWI for 
the time and expense its management incurred in enforcing the 
district court's injunction.   
 Turning to the amount of the award, we note that the 
district court enjoys wide, but not unlimited, discretion in 
fashioning appropriate compensatory sanctions:     
The framing of sanctions for civil contempt 
is committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court.  . . . But this discretion is 
not unlimited.  Compensatory sanctions . . . 
must not exceed the actual loss suffered by 
the party that was wronged. 
   
Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 473 (1992).   
 We believe the district court in this case stepped over 
the line that separates acceptable and unacceptable exercises of 
discretion.  It reduced its award of counsel fees to reflect 
RWI's limited success and then, without explanation, proceeded to 
award all of the other expenses incurred by RWI in connection 
with its contempt motion.  For this reason, on the basis of the 
record, the award of other expenses without an adjustment for the 
limited degree of RWI's success can only be characterized as 
arbitrary and we have no choice but to vacate it.1 
 
IV. 
 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand with instructions to enter an order finding appellants in 
contempt and awarding attorneys' fees of $68,707.52.  We leave to 
the discretion of the district court whether to reopen the record 
and give further consideration to the application for expenses.   
                                                           
1Because we thus find the award of expenses arbitrary, and 
because Mr. Lamont's testimony provides no basis for allocating 
expenses between successful and unsuccessful contentions, it is 
unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether that testimony, 
given its conclusory nature, would otherwise provide sufficient 
support for an award.  We regard that issue as a very close one 
and express no opinion on it. 
